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1 Introduction
The market equilibrium problem consists of nding a set of prices and allocations of goods to
economic agents such that each agent maximizes her utility, subject to her budget constraints,
and the market clears. The equilibrium equations, which are satised under mild assumptions
[1], express a static condition characterized by the fact that the market demand for each good
equals its market supply. This notion fails to predict any kind of dynamics leading to an
equilibrium, although it conveys the intuition that, in any process leading to a stable state
where demand equals supply, a disequilibrium price of a good will have to increase if the
demand for such a good exceeds its supply, and viceversa [3, 4].
The proofs of existence of equilibria [12] use general xed point theorems and therefore
do not tell us how an equilibrium can be eciently computed. An important question that
theoretical computer scientists have begun to address is whether there are ecient algorithms
for computing equilibria. The general problem seems to be computationally hard (see [13],
p.526), and the research has been focusing on markets which satisfy some economically
meaningful restrictions.
It has been shown that equilibria can be computed in polynomial time in various spe-
cial cases, the most important of which are exchange economies1 when traders have utility
functions that are linear [8, 11], Cobb-Douglas [9], or a range of CES functions [7]. These
important special cases are all instances where the market satises a property called weak
gross substitutability (WGS). Classical results in economics - see below - show that the price
equilibria in such markets are characterized by an innite number of linear inequalities and
therefore form a convex set.
The combinatorial algorithm presented in [8] takes advantage of the special structure of
the demand when the traders have linear utility functions and proportional initial endow-
ments. The results in [11, 7] are based on explicit descriptions of the convex sets which
characterize the equilibria for linear and a range of CES functions.
In this paper, we show that under fairly general assumptions, there are polynomial-time
algorithms to compute equilibria in all markets that satisfy weak gross substitutability. To
show our results, we need to build on the proofs that characterize the equilibria as a convex
set using the right assumptions and ideas.
We present and analyze two algorithms:
1. A discrete version of the price-adjustment mechanism, known as ta^tonnement, which
computes an approximation to the equilibrium in polynomial time, and with a poly-
nomial dependence on the approximation parameter. This algorithm is particularly
simple. A preliminary version of the result was presented in [6].
2. An algorithm based on the Ellipsoid algorithm, which approximates the equilibrium
in polynomial time, and which turns out to be exponentially better than algorithm 1.
in terms of the dependence on the approximation parameter. A preliminary version of
the result was presented in [5].
1Exchange economies are markets where the focus is on trading goods, while their actual production is
ignored.
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As a consequence, we obtain alternative polynomial time algorithms for computing equi-
libria for exchange economies with linear, Cobb-Douglas, and a range of CES utility func-
tions that satisfy weak gross substitutability. Unlike previously known polynomial time
algorithms, our approach does not make use of the specic form of these utility functions
and is in this sense more general.
Our results are built upon Lemma 1.1 below, which has been proven by Arrow, Block,
and Hurwicz [2] (the related denitions are in the next section).
Lemma 1.1 If an equilibrium price vector ^ satises ^j > 0, for each good j, if the market
satises gross substitutability (GS), positive homogeneity, and Walras' law, then for any non-
equilibrium price vector  such that j > 0 for each j, we have ^
TZ() > 0, where Z() is
the market excess demand at price .
The Lemma generalizes to the case where there is only WGS [3, 4], and immediately
implies that the set of equilibrium prices form a convex set. It also gives, for any positive
price vector  that is not an equilibrium price vector, a separating hyperplane [10], that is,
a hyperplane that separates  from the convex set of equilibrium prices. Indeed we haveP
j ^jZj() > 0, but
P
j jZj() = 0, by Walras' law.
The Lemma can be used to show the convergence under WGS of the ta^tonnement process
governed by the dierential equation system:
dk
dt
= Gk(Zk()); k = 1; 2; : : : ; n; (1)
where Gk() is some continuous and dierentiable, sign-preserving function.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the exchange
market model and provide some basic denitions. In Section 3 we describe a transformation
of the input market into another one with certain desirable properties. In Section 4 we
describe a computationally useful separation inequality.
In Section 5 we present and analyze a discrete version of the ta^tonnement process that
runs in polynomial time. In Section 6 we present a dierent algorithm with a better depen-
dance on the approximation parameter, which uses the Ellipsoid algorithm.
Finally, in Section 7 we provide some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
We rst describe the exchange market model and provide some basic denitions.
Let us consider a market M with m economic agents who represent traders of n goods.
Let Rn+ denote the subset of R
n with all nonnegative coordinates. The j-th coordinate in
Rn will stand for good j.
Each trader i has a concave utility function ui : R
n
+ ! R+, which represents her
preferences for the dierent bundles of goods, and an initial endowment of goods wi =
(wi1; : : : ; win) 2 Rn+.
The utility function ui is nonsatiable if for any x 2 Rn+ there is a y 2 Rn+ such that
ui(y) > ui(x). Nonsatiation is considered, in the theory of equilibrium, a standard and
extremely mild assumption (see [12], p. 42). We will assume that each trader is initially
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endowed with a strictly positive amount of at least one good, that is, wi 6= 0. Let Wj =P
iwij denote the total amount of good j in the market.
The input size of M is dened to be the number of traders plus the number of goods
plus the number of bits needed for encoding the rational numbers that describe the utility
functions and initial endowments.
An equilibrium is dened to be a vector of prices  = (1; : : : ; n) 2 Rn+ at which there
is a bundle xi = (xi1; : : : ; xin) 2 Rn+ of goods for each trader i such that the following two
conditions hold:
(i) For each trader i, the vector xi maximizes ui(x) subject to the constraints  x   wi
and x 2 Rn+, and
(ii) For each good j,
P
i xij  Wj.
Note that the constraint2   x   wi in (i) says that the bundle x should cost no more
than the income  wi of trader i. Thus an equilibrium is a price vector at which the market
clears when traders exchange their initial endowments for a bundle of goods in an optimal
way.
For any price vector , the vector xi() that maximizes ui(x) subject to the constraints
  x    wi and x 2 Rn+ is called the demand of trader i at prices .
In this paper, we assume that the maximizing vector is unique if it exists. This is the
case with many of the commonly used utility functions. Notice that for any  2 Rn+, the set
fx 2 Rn+j  x    wig of feasible bundles for trader i is non-empty, since 0 is contained in
it. However, it can be unbounded if some of the prices in  are zero. In such a situation,
ui(x) may not attain its maximum, and if this happens we say that the demand xi() is
undened. We stress that xi() can be undened only if one or more components of  is
zero.
The excess demand of trader i is zi() = xi()   wi. Then Xk() =
P
i xik() denotes
the market demand (or aggregate demand) of good k at prices , and Zk() = Xk()  
Wk =
P
i zik() the market excess demand of good k at prices . The vectors X() =
(X1(); : : : ; Xn()) and Z() = (Z1(); : : : ; Zn()) are called market demand (or aggregate
demand) and market excess demand, respectively. Naturally, market demand and excess
demand are undened if some individual demand is undened. The nonsatiability of the
utility functions implies that at any price  for which the demand is well-dened, Walras'
Law holds: TZ() = 0.
In terms of the excess demand function, the equilibrium is dened as a vector of prices
 = (1; : : : ; n) 2 Rn+ such that Zj()  0, for each j.
In this article we assume that (the excess demand of) the market M satises weak gross
substitutability (WGS). That is, for any two sets of prices  and 0 such that 0 < j  0j, for
each j, and j < 
0
j for some j, we have that k = 
0
k for any good k implies Zk()  Zk(0).
That is, increasing the prices for some of the goods while keeping some others xed cannot
cause a decrease in the aggregate demand for the goods whose price is xed. Clearly, a
market satises WGS if the excess demand of each individual trader does.
2Given two vectors x and y, we use x  y or xT y to denote their inner product.
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2.1 Approximate Equilibria
The algorithms we develop here compute approximate equilibria. To keep the denitions of
approximate equilibria simple, we assume that all the utility functions u() discussed in this
paper satisfy u(0) = 0.
Denition 2.1 A bundle xi 2 Rn+ is a -approximate demand (for   1) of trader i at
prices  if ui(xi)  1u and Txi  Twi, where u = maxfui(x)jx 2 Rn+; Tx  Twig.
A price vector  2 Rn+ is a weak -approximate equilibrium (  1) if there is a bundle
xi for each i such that (1) for each trader i, xi is a -approximate demand of trader i at
prices , and (2)
P
i xij  
P
iwij for each good j.
Observe that a 1-approximate equilibrium is just an equilibrium. For  > 1, a -
approximate equilibrium relaxes the requirement that traders obtain optimal bundles to
the requirement that traders obtain nearly optimal bundles. The relaxation on other fronts
{ approximate satisfaction of budget constraints, and approximate market clearance{ are
only included for reasons of convenience. This is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 Let prices  be a weak -approximate equilibrium, and xi's be the corresponding
allocations. Let yi =
1

xi. Then yi is a 
2-approximate demand at , satisfying (i)   yi 
  wi for each trader i, and (ii)
P
i yij 
P
iwij for each good j.
Proof: We have   yi = 1  xi    wi, since xi is a -approximate demand at prices
. This establishes (i). Similarly, we have
P
i yij =
1

xij 
P
iwij, and thus we have (ii).
Finally, by the concavity of the ui's it follows that
ui(yi)  1

ui(xi) +

1  1


ui(0)
 1

ui(xi)
 1
2
ui(xi());
where xi() denotes the actual demand of trader i.
We also need a simple property of approximate demands that concerns their resilience to
small price changes.
Lemma 2.3 Let  and 0 be two sets of prices in Rn+, and " > 0 be such that for each j we
have (1) 0j  (1 + ")  j, and (2) j  (1 + ")  0j. Let xi be a -approximate demand for
trader i at prices . Then xi is a (1 + ")
2-approximate demand for trader i at prices 0.
Proof:
We will rst show that xi approximately satises the budget constraint, to within a factor
of (1 + ")2, at prices 0. Using (1) and the fact that   xi    wi, we get
0  xi =
X
j
0jxij  (1 + ")
X
j
jxij  (1 + ")  wi: (2)
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Using (2) we get
  wi =
X
j
jwij  (1 + ")
X
j
0jwij = (1 + ")
0  wi: (3)
Substituting (3) in (2), we get
0  xi  (1 + ")20  wi:
We will now show that xi approximately maximizes trader i's utility function at 
0. Let
x = xi() and y = xi(0).
Set z = y

(1+")2
. By denition of y, we have
0  y  0  wi:
Using (1) and (2), we transform this into
1
(1 + ")
  y  (1 + ")  wi:
This implies that   z    wi. Since z 2 Rn+ and   z    wi, ui(x)  ui(z).
Therefore,
ui(x
)  ui(z)
= ui

y
(1 + ")2

= ui

y
(1 + ")2
+ (1  1
(1 + ")2
)  0

 1
(1 + ")2
ui(y
) +

1  1
(1 + ")2

ui(0) (by concavity of ui)
=
1
(1 + ")2
ui(y
) (since ui(0) = 0):
Since ui(xi)  1ui(x), it follows that
ui(xi)  1
(1 + ")2
ui(y
):
This completes the proof.
2.2 Demand Oracle
Our algorithms will assume a subroutine to compute the demand approximately at a given
price vector. This is a reasonable assumption, since the demand is computed by solving a
convex program for each trader.
Denition 2.4 An exchange market M is said to be equipped with a demand oracle if there
is an algorithm that takes as input a price vector  2 Qn+ and a positive rational  < 1, and
returns a vector Y = (Y1; Y2; : : : ; Yn) such that jYj   Zj()j   for all j. The algorithm is
required to run in polynomial time in the input size and in log(1=).
We assume henceforth that the market M is equipped with a demand oracle.
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3 A Useful Transformation
We will now describe a transformation of the input market M (the one for which we wish to
compute an equilibrium) into a market M^ whose excess demand function has some desirable
properties. Furthermore, the ratio of the maximum to minimum price at any equilibrium
price vector for M^ is nicely bounded. The market M^ can be thought of as a \perturbation"
of M , and readily inherits WGS as well as a demand oracle.
It is convenient to describe the transformation in two steps. In the rst, we obtain an
intermediate marketM 0 in which the total amount of each good is 1. The new utility function
of the i-th trader is given by u0i(x1; : : : ; xn) = ui(W1x1; : : : ;Wnxn). It can be veried that, if
ui() is concave, then u
0
i() is concave. The new initial endowment of the j-th good held by the
i-th trader is w0ij = wij=Wj. Let w
0
i denote (w
0
i1; : : : ; w
0
in) 2 Rn+. Clearly, W 0j =
P
iw
0
ij = 1.
The following lemma summarizes some key properties of the transformation.
Lemma 3.1 1. For any   1, (xi1; : : : ; xin) is a -approximate demand at prices (1; : : : ; n)
for trader i inM 0 if and only if (W1xi1; : : : ;Wnxin) is a -approximate demand at prices
( 1
W1
; : : : ; n
Wn
) for trader i in M .
2. For any   1, (1; : : : ; n) is a weak -approximate equilibrium for M 0 if and only if
( 1
W1
; : : : ; n
Wn
) is a weak -approximate equilibrium for M .
3. M 0 has a demand oracle if M does. The excess demand of M 0 satises WGS if the
excess demand of M does.
We transform M 0 into the market M^ as follows. Let 0 <   1 be a parameter. For each
trader i, the new utility function and initial endowments are the same, that is, u^i() = u
0
i(),
and w^i = w
0
i. The new market M^ has one extra trader, whose initial endowment is given by
w^m+1 = (; : : : ; ), and whose utility function is the Cobb-Douglas
3 function um+1(xm+1) =Q
j x
1=n
m+1;j. A trader with this Cobb-Douglas utility function spends
1
n
-th of her budget on
each good. Stated precisely, jxm+1;j() =   w^m+1=n. The extra trader allows us to show
that at any equilibrium for M^ the ratio between the largest price and the smallest price is
bounded above.
Note that the total amount of good j in the market M^ is W^j =
Pm+1
i=1 w^ij = 1 + .
Lemma 3.2 (1) The market M^ has an equilibrium. (2) Every equilibrium  of M^ satises
the condition
maxj j
minj j
 2n=. (3) For any   1, a weak -approx equilibrium for M^ is a
weak (1 + )-approx equilibrium for M 0. (4) M^ satises WGS if M 0 does. (5) M^ has a
demand oracle if M 0 does.
Proof: (1) follows from standard arguments. Briey, a quasi-equilibrium  2 Rn+ with
j 6= 0 always exists ([12], Chapter 17, Proposition 17.BB.2). A quasi-equilibrium  is
dened as a price vector at which there are allocations xi 2 Rn+ for each trader i so that
(a)
P
i xij 
P
i w^ij for each good j, and (b) for each trader i, any bundle y such that
ui(y) > ui(xi) should satisfy  y   w^i. Observe that (b) is a weakening of the requirement
3The Cobb-Douglas utility function has the general form ui(x) =
Q
j(xij)
aij , where aij  0 and
P
j aij =
1.
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that xi be a utility-maximizing bundle at price ; in particular, a trader whose income is 0
at price  is allowed to have an xi that is not utility maximizing.
However, at price  the income   w^m+1 of the (m+1)'th trader is strictly positive. This
ensures that that j > 0 for each good j. Since each trader is assumed to have a strictly
positive amount of each good, this means that the income   w^i of each trader i is strictly
positive. From this it follows that each xi is actually utility maximizing (see [12], Chapter
17, Proposition 17.BB.1), and so  is an equilibrium.
For (2), assume that the equilibrium price vector  is scaled so that maxj j = 1. At
price , the income of the (m + 1)'th trader is   w^m+1  . Since the (m + 1)'th trader
has the Cobb-Douglas utility function described above, she spends exactly a fraction 1=n of
her income on each good. For any good k, her demand for the good is therefore at least 
nk
.
We must have 
nk
 W^k = (1 + )  2, which implies that k  2n .
For (3), assume that  is a weak -approximate equilibrium for M^ , and, for 1  i  m+1,
let xi be the corresponding bundles. Evidently, for each 1  i  m, xi is a -approximate
demand for i in the market M 0, and thus also a (1 + )-approximate demand. For each
good k, we have
Pm+1
i=1 xik  W^k. Since xm+1;k  0, this implies that
Pm
i=1 xik  W^k =
(1 + )W 0k. Thus  is a weak (1 + )-approx equilibrium for M
0.
For (4), note that the individual excess demand of the (m + 1)'th trader satises WGS.
The claim follows because the aggregate excess demand of M^ is the sum of the aggregate
excess demand of M 0 and the individual excess demand of the (m+ 1)'th trader.
(5) follows for the same reason.
4 Computationally Useful Separation Inequalities
Our strategy is to compute a (1 + ")-approximate equilibrium for M^ . From Lemma 3.1
and Lemma 3.2 (applied with  = "), this (1 + ")-approximate equilibrium will then be a
(1 +O("))-approximate equilibrium for M .
We dene  = f 2 Rn+j=2n  j  1 for each jg. Note that Lemma 3.2 implies
that M^ has an equilibrium price in . We dene + = f 2 Rn+j=2n   =4n  j 
1 + =4n for each jg.
Our algorithms aim to nd an equilibrium for M^ in . In this section, we describe the
main tool that lets our algorithms make progress from an arbitrary candidate vector  2 +.
Assuming that  is not a weak (1 + ")-approx equilibrium for M^ , the following two lemmas
show that the hyperplane normal to Z() and passing through  separates  from all points
within a distance  of any equilibrium of M^ in . We henceforth let Z() and X() denote,
respectively, the excess demand vector and the aggregate demand vector in the market M^ .
Lemma 4.1 For any  2 +, jjZ()jj2  8n2=.
Proof: In the following sequence, the third inequality follows from Walras' Law using
simple manipulations, the fourth inequality holds because  2 +, and the fth inequality
7
holds because W^j  2 for each j.
jjZ()jj2 
X
j
jZj()j

X
j
Xj() +
X
j
W^j
 maxk k
mink k
X
j
W^j +
X
j
W^j
 2n

X
j
W^j +
X
j
W^j
 4n
2

+ 2n
 8n
2

:
The following lemma and its proof build upon classic work of Arrow et al. [2], and, in
particular, on Lemma 1.1 stated in the Introduction of this paper.
Lemma 4.2 Let  2 + be a price vector that is not a weak (1+")-approximate equilibrium
for M^ , for some " > 0. Then for any equilibrium ^ 2 , we have ^  Z()   > 0, where
  1 and 1= is bounded by a polynomial in n, 1
"
, and 1

.
Proof:
Let us assume that the goods are indexed so that
1
^1
 2
^2
     n
^n
:
Let ti =
i
^i
; we have t1  t2      tn.
We are going to dene a sequence of price vectors 1; : : : ; n. Let
s = (1; 2; : : : ; s 1; s = ts^s; ts^s+1; ts^s+2; : : : ; ts^n):
Thus s is the component-wise minimum of the two vectors  and ts^. Note that 
1 is the
equilibrium vector t1^ and 
n is the vector .
It is helpful to imagine that the vector t1^ is being transformed to  in n   1 steps via
the sequence of prices. We refer to the change in price from s to s+1 as the s'th step. Let
Ghs = f1; : : : ; sg and Gts = fs + 1; : : : ; ng. Ghs is the subset of goods whose prices remain
xed during the s'th step, and Gts is the complement step. Using WGS, it is easy to argue
that Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s) for j 2 Ghs , and Zj(s+1)  Zj(s)  0 for j 2 Gts.
The claim for j 2 Ghs is immediate from the denition of WGS, as in going from s to
s+1 we keep j's price xed and only increase some other prices. For j 2 Gts, let us consider
the vector
ts
ts+1
s+1 = (
ts
ts+1
1;
ts
ts+1
2; : : : ;
ts
ts+1
s; ts^s+1; ts^s+2; : : : ; ts^n):
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Since this is a scaling of s+1, the demand for any good at this vector is the same as at s+1.
In going from ts
ts+1
s+1 to s, the prices inG
t
s are xed while the prices inG
h
s can only increase,
so the demand for any j 2 Gts only increases. Thus Zj(s+1)  Zj(s). Furthermore, since
j 2 Gts implies that j 2 Gts0 for s0 < s, we have
Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)      Zj(1):
For the sake of clarity, let us divide the rest of the proof into two steps.
Step 1. Here we will show that
^  Z(s+1)  Z(s)  0 for each 1  s  n  1: (4)
From Walras' law, we have
0 = s+1  Z(s+1)  s  Z(s)
=
X
j2Ghs
j

Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)

+
X
j2Gts
ts+1^jZj(
s+1) 
X
j2Gts
ts^jZj(
s)
= ts+1
X
j
^j

Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)
  X
j2Ghs
(ts+1^j   j)

Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)

+
X
j2Gts
(ts+1   ts)^jZj(s):
Rearranging, we get
ts+1^ 

Z(s+1)  Z(s) = X
j2Ghs
(ts+1^j   j)

Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)
  X
j2Gts
(ts+1   ts)^jZj(s):
Since ts+1^j   j = ts+1^j   tj^j  ts+1^j   ts^j for j 2 Ghs , Zj(s+1)   Zj(s)  0 for
j 2 Ghs , and Zj(s)  0 for j 2 Gts, we obtain
ts+1^ 

Z(s+1)  Z(s)  (ts+1   ts) X
j2Ghs
^j

Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)

:
Rearranging, we obtain
^  Z(s+1)  Z(s)  ts+1   ts
ts+1
X
j2Ghs
^j

Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)

: (5)
Since the right hand side of the inequality is non-negative, we have shown (4).
Step 2. Here we show that for at least one s, the right hand side of inequality (5) is
signicantly larger than 0.
We say that the k'th step is a big step if tk+1   tk  "t13n . We rst claim that there must
be a big step. For otherwise, we have tn   t1  "t13 , and this implies that for each j,
t1^j  tj^j = j  tn^j  (1 + "=3)t1^j:
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Applying Lemma 2.3 to the vectors t1^ and , we see that the demand at t1^ is a (1 + ")-
approximate demand at . Since the market clears with the demand at equilibrium t1^, this
implies that  is a weak (1 + ")-approximate equilibrium, a contradiction.
Suppose that the s'th step is a big step. We have the following lower bound on the
increase of the income of the (m+ 1)'th trader when prices change from s to s+1.
s+1  wm+1   s  wm+1  s+1n wm+1;n   snwm+1;n
= (ts+1   ts)^nwm+1;n:
Recall that the (m + 1)'th trader is a Cobb-Douglas trader with a utility function that
ensures that she spends 1
n
th of her income on each good. As a result we have
xm+1;1(
s+1)  xm+1;1(s) = 
s+1  wm+1
ns+11
  
s  wm+1
ns1
=
1
n1
(s+1  wm+1   s  wm+1)
 ts+1   ts
n1
^nwm+1;n:
Since the original market M satises WGS and 1 2 Ghs , we have
mX
i=1
xi;1(
s+1) 
mX
i=1
xi;1(
s)  0:
Adding the two inequalities, we get
Z1(
s+1)  Z1(s)  ts+1   ts
n1
^nwm+1;n:
Since the transformed market M^ satises WGS (Lemma 3.2), we have Zj(
s+1) Zj(s) 
0 for each j 2 Ghs and j 6= 1. Thus, we haveX
j2Ghs
^j(Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s))  ts+1   ts
n1
^1^nwm+1;n:
This completes Step 2 of the proof. Plugging this inequality into Equation 5, and using
the fact that ts+1   ts  "t13n , we have
^  Z(s+1)  Z(s)  ts+1   ts
ts+1
X
j2Ghs
^j

Zj(
s+1)  Zj(s)

 ts+1   ts
ts+1
ts+1   ts
n1
^1^nwm+1;n
 "
2t21
9n31ts+1
^1^nwm+1;n:
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Adding to this inequality the sequence of inequalities
^ 
h
Z(s
0+1)  Z(s0)
i
 0 for each 1  s0  n  1; s0 6= s;
we obtain
^  Z(n)  Z(1)  "2t21
9n31ts+1
^1^nwm+1;n:
Since n = , and ^  Z(1) = ^  Z(t1^) = 0 by Walras' law,
^  Z()  "
2t21
9n31ts+1
^1^nwm+1;n:
Since ; ^ 2 +, each component of these vectors is bounded above by a polynomial in
n and 1

, and below by the inverse of such a polynomial. The same is therefore true for the
ti. Note that wm+1;n = . Thus the proof of the lemma is completed.
5 Computing Equilibria via Ta^tonnement
We now present an ecient algorithm, which is a discrete version of ta^tonnement, for com-
puting an approximate equilibrium for a market M . The algorithm does this by computing
an approximate equilibrium for the transformed market M^ . We start with an arbitrary price
vector in the region . In each iteration, if the current vector is an approximate equilibrium,
we are done. Otherwise, we compute the excess demand vector at the current price and take
a step in the direction of the excess demand vector. A special case occurs when the current
vector is not in +; in this case, we \manually" move to a vector within .
5.1 The Algorithm
Let 0, the initial price, be any point in . Suppose we have computed a sequence of prices
0; : : : ; i 1. We compute i as follows. If i 1 62 +, we let i be the point in  closest
to i 1. In other words, ij = 
i 1
j if =2n  i 1j  1; ij = 1 if i 1j > 1; ij = =2n if
i 1j < =2n.
If i 1 2 +, then we use the demand oracle to compute a vector Y i 1 = (Y i 11 ; : : : ; Y i 1n )
such that jY i 1j   Zj(i 1)j  =4n for each j. We let
i = i 1 +

2
 1
(9n2=)2
Y i 1:
5.2 Analysis
Let us x an equilibrium  of M^ in . We argue that in each iteration, the distance to 
falls signicantly so long as we don't encounter an approximate equilibrium in +. If the
current iteration started o from a vector not in +, this decrease in distance follows from
direct inspection. On the other hand, if the current iteration started o from a vector in
+, the decrease in distance is derived from Lemma 4.2. The details follow.
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Let us consider the i'th iteration where we move from i 1 to i. If i 1 62 +, we have
ji 1j   j j   jij   j j  0 for each j, while ji 1j   j j   jij   j j  =4n for some j. From
this it follows that
jj   i 1jj2   jj   ijj2  (=4n)2:
Now suppose that i 1 2 + and that i 1 is not a weak (1 + ")-approx equilibrium for
M^ . By Lemma 4.2,   Z(i 1)  . Since i 1  Z(i 1) = 0 by Walras' Law, we have
(   i 1)  Z(i 1)  . Now
(   i 1)  Y i 1  (   i 1)  Z(i 1) 
X
j
jY i 1j   Zj(i 1)j  jj   i 1j j
   
X
j

4n
 2
 =2:
Also note that since jjZ(i 1)jj2  8n2= (Lemma 4.1), and jjZ(i 1)  Y i 1jj2  1, the
triangle inequality implies that jjY i 1jj2  9n2=.
Let q denote the vector 
2
1
(9n2=)2
Y i 1, the step taken in the i'th iteration. We have
(   i 1   q)  q = (   i 1)  q   q  q
=

2
1
(9n2=)2

(   i 1)  Y i 1   
2
1
(9n2=)2
Y i 1  Y i 1

 
2
1
(9n2=)2

=2  
2
1
(9n2=)2
(9n2=)2

 0:
Thus,
jj   i 1jj2   jj   ijj2 = jj   i 1jj2   jj   i 1   qjj2
= (   i 1)  q + (   i 1   q)  q
 (   i 1)  q
=

2
 1
(9n2=)2
(   i 1)  Y i 1
 
2
4(9n2=)2
;
Suppose that every vector in the sequence 0; : : : ; k is either (a) not in +, or (b) in
+ but is not a weak (1 + ")-approx equilibrium. We then have
jj   i 1jj2   jj   ijj2  minf 
2
4(9n2=)2
; (=4n)2g;
for 1  i  k. Let  denote minf 2
4(9n2=)2
; (=4n)2g: Adding these inequalities, we get
k  jj   0jj2   jj   kjj2  n:
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Thus k  n

. We conclude that within n

+ 1 iterations, the algorithm computes a price
in + which is a weak (1 + ")-approximate equilibrium for M^ . It can be veried that the
bound on  is polynomial in the input size of the original market M , 1=", and 1=. Setting
 = " in the transformation corresponding to Lemma 3.2, and putting everything together,
we obtain:
Theorem 5.1 Let M be an exchange market whose excess demand function satises WGS,
and suppose that M is equipped with a demand oracle. For any 0 < " < 1, the ta^tonnement
based algorithm computes, in time polynomial in the input size of M and 1=", a sequence of
prices one of which is a weak (1 + ")-approx equilibrium for M .
In order to actually pick the approximate equilibrium price from the sequence of prices,
we need an ecient algorithm that recognizes an approximate equilibrium of M . In fact,
it is sucient for this algorithm to assert that a given price  is a weak (1 + 2")-approx
equilibrium provided  is a weak (1+")-approx equilibrium. Since the problem of recognizing
an approximate equilibrium is an explicitly presented convex programming problem, such
an algorithm is generally quite easy to construct.
6 Algorithm Based on Ellipsoid Method
In this section, we describe an algorithm that computes a (1+")-approximate equilibrium for
market M in time that is polynomial in the input size of M and in log 1
"
. This is in contrast
to the ta^tonnement based algorithm of the previous section, whose running time depends
polynomially on 1
"
. As before, we will focus on computing a (1+ ")-approximate equilibrium
for the transformed market M^ . We will use the Ellipsoid algorithm. In order to apply this
method, we will rst dene a suitable size convex body that contains an equilibrium price
vector.
Let  be some equilibrium for M^ in +. Let
 = minf 
4n
;

4n(9n2=)
g ;
where  is as in Lemma 4.2. Let D denote the cube
f 2 Rn j jj   j j  g:
The cube D is small enough to have several useful properties listed below, while having
large enough volume for the Ellipsoid method.
Lemma 6.1 We have (i) D  +; (ii) for any  2 + that is not a weak (1+")-approximate
equilibrium,  2 D, and Y 2 Rn such that jYj   Zj()j  8n for 1  j  n, we have
  Y    Y .
Proof: That D  + is a consequence of  2  and   
4n
. To show (ii), we rst note
that
  Y    Z()    (Y   Z())    Z() 
X
j
j
8n
   
X
j
2
8n
 3
4
;
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where in the penultimate inequality we use Lemma 4.2 and the fact that that j  2.
Similarly,
  Y    Z() +
X
j
j
8n
 0 + 
4
 
4
:
Finally, for  2 D, we bound
  Y    Y   j(   )  Y j
 3
4
  n  jjY jj2
 3
4
  
4
 
2
:
where we used the bound from Lemma 4.1:
jjY jj2  jjZ()jj2 + jjY   Z()jj2  8n
2

+ 1  9n
2

:
Since   Y  
2
> 
4
   Y , we have completed the proof of (ii).
The Ellipsoid Application
We are now ready to apply the central-cut ellipsoid method, Theorem 3.21 from [10]. Here
is the central-cut ellipsoid theorem, slightly modied to suit our purpose:
Theorem 6.2 There is an algorithm, called the central-cut ellipsoid method, that solves the
following problem:
Input: A rational number  > 0 and a closed convex set C  Rn contained in a ball of
radius R. There is an oracle that for any  2 Qn either accepts  or nds a vector c 2 Qn
such that c    c   for any  2 C.
Output: Either (i) a vector a 2 Qn that the oracle accepts, or (ii) an ellipsoid E such
that C  E and vol(E)  .
The number of calls that the algorithm makes to the oracle is polynomial in n and the
encoding length of its input parameters R and . The number of bits used to represent the
rational numbers in the vectors given to the oracle is also bounded by such a polynomial.
To apply the theorem, we let the closed convex set C be the cube D. We choose R = 2n
since D  + is contained in a ball of radius 2n centered at the origin. We let  be a positive
rational number that is smaller than the volume of D, and its decimal representation has a
number of bits that is polynomial in n, log 1=, and log 1=". Note that such a  does exist
and is readily computed.
As for the oracle, it works as follows. If  2 + and  is a (1+")-approximate equilibrium
for M^ , the oracle accepts. Otherwise, there are two cases:
14
  62 +: Then there is a j such that either j < 4n or j > 1 + 4n . If j < 4n ,
the oracle returns c =  ej, where ej is the coordinate vector in the j-th direction. If
j > 1 +

4n
, the oracle returns c = ej. From Lemma 6.1 (i), it follows that c    c  
for any  2 D.
  2 +: We consult the demand oracle to nd a Y 2 Rn+ such that jYj   Zj()j  8n
for 1  j  n. The oracle returns c =  Y . From Lemma 6.1 (ii), it follows that
c    c   for any  2 D.
What is the output of the central-cut ellipsoid method on the input we have described?
One possibility is that it is an ellipsoid E such that D  E and vol(E)  . But this is
impossible since  < vol(D). Thus we can conclude that the ellipsoid algorithm produces a
vector that the oracle accepts, that is, a weak (1 + ")-approximate equilibrium in +.
As for the running time, we observe that the number of calls that the ellipsoid algorithm
makes to its oracle is bounded by a polynomial in n, log 1=, and log 1=". This oracle may
in turn call the demand oracle, but the overall running time of this call is bounded by a
polynomial in the input size of market M , log 1=, and log 1=". We may conclude that the
running time of the overall algorithm is also bounded by such a polynomial.
Setting  = ", we obtain a weak (1 + O("))-approximate equilibrium for the original
market M (Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2).
Theorem 6.3 Let M be an exchange market whose excess demand function satises WGS,
and suppose that M is equipped with a demand oracle. For any 0 < " < 1, the above
algorithm computes, in time polynomial in the input size of M and in log 1=", a sequence of
prices one of which is a weak (1 + ")-approx equilibrium for M .
7 Conclusions
We have developed a quite general framework which allowed us to introduce two ecient
algorithms for the computation of equilibria in exchange markets where the traders have
linear, Cobb-Douglas, or some CES utility functions. We expect our framework to work or
be readily adaptable to handle other exchange markets, provided that the utility functions
satisfy weak gross substitutability.
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